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President's Address
Delivered by HoN. W. G. MfoLiAREN at Bellingham Meeting,
August, 1937
It is one of the traditions of the legal profession that the President of a State Bar Association shall deliver an annual address.
Whatever other merits or demerits may surround this custom,
it probably does provide an appropriate occasion or opportunity
for the members of the profession to suspend their activities for
a brief period and to take stock, as it were, to see what progress
has been made in the past, what new influences are arising affecting the legal profession, and in what direction we are being carried
by the ever changing currents of public affairs in our form of
government.
I think it is safe to say that during the last five or ten years
the legal profession has become increasingly "Bar Association
conscious", and that this tendency has become particularly manifest during the last two or three years.
The accuracy of this statement may be confirmed by several
events, I think. For example, the idea of a State integrated bar,
the effectiveness of which has now become firmly established as a
successful plan for administering the internal problems of the
legal profession, not only of the bar itself but also for increasing
the influence of its members upon the public life of which they
form an important part.
It is no longer necessary to argue the merits of the integrated
bar plan. You will be interested to know that at least eighteen
states in the Union have already adopted essentially the same
plan, and other states are underway in their efforts to secure such
adoption. No state has ever gone back or retreated from the
integrated bar plan to the old voluntary state association.
It has been my privilege to have had something to do with the
three successive bar association systems which this state has had,
and what I have to say upon the question is based upon a considerable amount of first-hand information. In the early years the
state took no cognizance whatever of the bar associations. The
matter of enforcing the maintenance of standards of professional
conduct was left in the main to the judgment and composite conscience of each local bar. Under that system it was my privilege
to act for a few years as "Bar Association Prosecutor" for the
Seattle Bar Association. Other communities with their respective
grievance committees had similar makeshift plans in regard to
matters of discipline. You will observe that this plan was entirely
voluntary, where each community had its own plan, entirely unassociated with the others, and the state took no notice whatsoever,
except to furnish courts of law in which disbarment cases were
tried. Later on, the state took cognizance of bar association affairs
by providing for a state board of law examiners consisting of
three members appointed by the Supreme Court. It was my privilege to serve for three years on this state board. Now, mark you,
this board, limited to three in number, was required by the provisions of the act not only to investigate and determine all com-
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plaints and all applications for reinstatement of attorneys who had
been suspended or disbarred, but also to supervise the entire matter
of conducting examinations for admission to the bar, and of
applications for admission upon motion.
This system prevailed until 1933, and I can say with considerable assurance that no three men constituting a state board of
law examiners, regardless of what their abilities may have been,
could adequately have performed the functions which that act
imposed upon them.
While I do not for a moment nean to imply that the present
system is perfect and therefore incapable of any further improvement, yet I do maintain that the present system with its board of
governors, one from each of the six congressional districts, supplemented by administrative and trial committees in the various
sections of the state, and a committee of law examiners, is so far
ahead of any previous plan that this state has ever enjoyed that
there is no comparison whatever, and there can be no argument
that we should go back to any one of the systems we have employed for so many years.
In commenting upon the progress which has been made under
the present system for the last four years, I wish to pay special
compliment to the members who have been upon your board. I
can say that without in any way including myself because the
president is upon your board for only one year whereas the members of the board are in office for three years. In 1933 the problem
which your board had to solve, namely, the problem of getting a
new system under way, was no small affair.
During the present year the terms of two members of the board
expired, namely, Mr. Allen Paine of Spokane, representing the
fifth congressional district, and Mr. Bert C. Ross of Seattle, representing the first congressional district. These gentlemen served
both their state and your profession with fidelity and ability during these four years, and I am pleased to make this public recognition and statement of appreciation of their splendid contribution.
During the year the board of governors has given considerable
thought to the matter of applicants desiring to be admitted to the
bar on motion, based upon their records of practice in other states.
While the board does not wish to close the door of opportunity
upon any worthy practitioner who desires to move to the state
of Washington, yet great care must be exercised in examining the
previous record of such an applicant in order to avoid finding ourselves a dumping ground for professional wanderers or ne,'erdo-wells who have found it advisable to leave their former place
of operation, for various reasons.
During the present year your board, with the approval of the
Supreme Court, adopted the practice of requiring a residence of
ninety days preceding the filing of any application for admission
on motion. I might add at this point that the State of California
has a residence requirement of six months. It was the thought of
the board, in which the court concurred, that such a requirement
would not only afford a better opportunity to examine into the
personal qualifications of the applicant but also it would tend
to divert from our midst a considerable number of lawyers who
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are disposed on impulse of the moment to apply for admission
without as yet having come to any real conclusion as to whether
they are going to become residents of our state, and who, if they
did so, would not be of particular benefit to the state or the profession.
Reinstatement
The question of reinstatement is one which causes your board
probably as much concern as any other one phase of its disciplinary work, bearing in mind at all times that it is the duty of
the board to make its recommendations to the Supreme Court
only after a most careful consideration. On the one hand, the
board cannot take the position or attitude that there is absolutely
no right of reinstatement after one has been disbarred, regardless
of the strength of the showing made. Nor, on the other hand, can
the board, in fairness to the public or the profession or to itself,
recommend every application for reinstatement which has been
presented to it and pass the problem on up to the Supreme Court
for final determination. The board feels, and rightfully, that it
has the initial and serious duty in such cases of giving to the
Supreme Court its matured, deliberate and well considered recommendation, and I say to you that there is not a Superior Court
judge or a Supreme Court judge of this state who gives to matters
coming to him any more serious and painstaking consideration
than does the board on this matter of members who have been
disbarred. We must not, of course, be deaf to the plea of the
applicant who claims he has been taught his lesson and has genuinely reformed, and desires now to renew earning his livelihood by
the practice of his profession, and yet, on the other hand, we must
not overlook the fact that there are other attorneys in his community who have at all times been faithful to the interests of their
clients, true to the standards of their profession, who have made
no trouble either for the authorities or their clients. It is no
small matter for the board to decide in favor of allowing a member
whose record has been adjudicated bad to be permitted to re-enter
the profession in direct competition with men whose high standards have always been scrupulously observed. Each case must, of
course, stand or fall upon its own merit, but, as we have been
shown here, the question becomes most pertinent as to whether
in view of this danger of overcrowding the legal profession, we
should aggravate this situation by adding to the number from
the lists of those whose conduct has caused them to be formally
and legally ejected from the ranks.
It almost invariably happens that reinstatement applications
are held ex parte. This is true for the reason that it is very seldom
that the original complaining parties who brought about the disbarment care to be present and be heard in opposition. It has
been the practice of the board when possible to give notice to the
complaining parties so they may be present and be heard. During
this year your board reached the conclusion that still further
opportunity should be accorded for anyone who might desire to
be heard and give reasons why a reinstatement should not be
granted. It was therefore recommended to the Supreme Court
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that notice be published in the Bar Journal, or such other publication as might be selected, giving notice of the time and place
of hearing of such reinstatement application. The Supreme Court
concurred in the matter and the rule has been formally adopted
as an amendment to the rules governing reinstatement hearings.
Legal Education
Now, just a word on the question of legal education. The board
has not made or suggested in this year any change relative to
educational requirements. As you probably already know, the
great majority of our applicants, I am happy to say, come before
the board armed with a diploma from an approved law school,
and this, of course, carries with it that he must have had a prelegal college course of at least two years; otherwise, his law school
would not have been an approved one.
As to those applicants who have not graduated from an approved law school, provision is made by the board that they must
have completed enough school work so as to have the acceptable
equivalent of half of a four years' college or university course.
And I think we need to remind ourselves of the tremendous increase in standards of educational requirements which have taken
place in a very few recent years. The most recent report of the
American Bar Association, section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, is dated July 1, 1937, and from that report
I find the following most interesting statistics. As recently as
1930 there were only fifteen states in the Union which required as
much as two years of pre-legal college education, and there were
another fifteen states at that time which demanded no- educational
qualifications whatsoever.
May I quote briefly from this report:
"Progress has been rapid since that time and today
there are thirty-four states in all which have adopted
rules requiring two years of college or the equivalent,
while the number of states with no educational requirements has shrunk to two, Arkansas and Georgia."
I trust that no members are offended by that reference to those
states. The report continues:
"The standards of the American Bar Association, as
adopted in 1921, recommended graduation from an approved law school. In addition to the entrance requirement of two years of pre-legal college education, such a
law school was required to have a three-year course if a
full-time school or a four-year course in cases where the
majority of classes were scheduled in the afternoon or
evening for the convenience of working students."
I notice in the same report in a foot note that the New Jersey
State Bar Association, at its last annual meeting, in June of this
year, recommended to the Supreme Court of that state the adoption of a college degree requirement.
We still have an occasional applicant for examination who has
prepared therefor by pursuing a course of study as a registered
law student, but in view of the tremendous increase in the educa-
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tional requirements for admission to the bar and a similar increase in the complexities of professional demands which are
made upon the practicing attorney, the question arises as to how
much longer we should continue in this state to recognize and
approve a law office course of study as an adequate preparation
for admission to the bar. Whatever may have been true in the
past as to the merits of a law office as a place in which a young
student might learn the science and practice of law, I doubt very
much whether the modern law office furnishes either the opportunity or the proper atmosphere for the obtaining of a legal
education.
There has been some complaint that the type of examination
given by our examining board did not sufficiently accord with
the type of examinations given by our two approved law schools
in this state. It was felt that there was a gap in there which was
sometimes the cause of injustice in the bar examination applicant
finding himself confronted with problems in a field of law for
which his law school study had made little, if any, provision.
There was recently arranged a conference between the faculties
of the two institutions, the chairman of the board of examiners
and your Committee on Legal Education. The purpose of that
conference was not to do away with bar examinations, nor even
that school examinations should be identical with the state bar
examinations, but it was thought the matter should be looked into
to avoid, if possible, the difficulty concerning which complaints
have been made. The problem is one of readjustments on both
sides, and whatever danger of injuries may have existed in the
past, I may state will be practically eliminated as the result of
these meetings.
The Courts' Reassertion of the Rule-Making Power
I wish to take just a little of your time at this point in discussing
the question of the rule-making power of the courts, because of
the bearing it has upon problems which are common to both
the bench and the bar. We are reminded by Professor Wigmore,
in a statement published by him in the last three or four months,
as follows:
"It is high time to raise a constitutional question which
has long remained in abeyance. We assert that the legislature exceeds its constitutional power when it attempts
to impose upon the judiciary any rules for the dispatch
of the judiciary's duties.
"That the legislature has no more constitutional business to dictate the procedure of the judiciary than the
judiciary has to dictate the procedure of the legislature."
Now that this problem has been opened up for thorough discussion, we wonder why the courts for these many years acquiesced
in this assumption of legislative power. It is my own opinion
that the courts themselves were originally to blame for this particular course of events. You will remember that under the old
common law system of pleading, the art or science of properly
instituting a law action had become such a web of finely spun
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distinctions that the practice of law and the machinery of the
courts had become converted into an arena for the playing o_ a
very interesting and legalistic game known as "Common law
pleading", rather than an instrumentality for the attaining of
justice to parties invoking the aid of the courts. It was only
after this situation had become unbearable that the lawyers, acting through their state legislatures, caused to ,be adopted and
forced upon an unwilling court, the Code System of Pleading.
This necessity for legislative interference to cure the indifference
of the courts was the entering wedge which led to a long-continuing assumption that the legislative department was the source of
all power as regards judicial procedure. Our own state avoided
any such constitutional issue by procuring the enactment of a
statute authorizing the courts to make all rules of procedure.
I submit to you this rule-making power must be kept under the
control of the judiciary, aided by the suggestions of the bar, if
the machinery for the administration for justice is to keep pace
with the improvements and progress of society in other matters.
We need not amplify the difficulties inherent in depending upon
legislative enactment for improvements in judicial procedure. Any
legislature having once adopted a system of code pleading is inclined to consider that matter as finally settled, thereby blocking
all prospects of future progress in the judicial machinery.
Just as this earlier indifference of the courts to their responsibilities led to the adoption of legislative code pleading systems,
so in turn a later legislative indifference regarding any further
improvements in procedure made it inevitable that the courts, aided by the influence of the bar, should re-assert the exercise of this
judicial function by destroying this static condition into which the
whole question of procedure had lapsed.
It is almost incredible today that there ever was a time when
a plaintiff was thrown out of court because, unfortunately, his
attorney had brought an action in debt when it should have been
indebitatus assumpsit, or a suit for trespass when it should have
been trespass upon the case. And it is almost equally incredible
that even in the recent history of our own state, many a lawyer
has gone out the window because he had served the proposed
statement of facts and then filed it rather than by reversing the
sequence of events, first filing and then serving it.
To contrast such a worship of the forms of law with the liberal
rules of procedure which we now in this state enjoy, I submit to
you, Members of the Profession, is exceedingly refreshing. For
example: all persons may now be joined as plaintiffs in one lawsuit in whom any right to relief arising out of the same transaction is thought to exist, whether jointly or severally, and they
may bring all such persons in as parties defendant as they may
believe are parties from whom they may be entitled to redress,
and have all rights determined under one lawsuit. Consider
again that by these new rules adopted by our court, a new cause
of action which would not have been barred if stated in the
original complaint may be introduced by amendment in spite of
the statute having meanwhile run if the adverse party was fairly
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apprised of the nature of the cause of action by the original
pleading.
Many other illustrations might be given, all of which serve
to point unerringly to the fact that a lawyer of today, whether
a practitioner at the bar or a judge upon the bench, has ceased to
consider rules of procedure as an end in themselves, and has
come to recognize that which always should have been the case,
that such rules are, after all, a mere means to an end, namely,
the administration of justice in whatever court the litigation may
be found.
Federal Rules
This desire for the improvement of procedure and a recognition
that the court is the natural source for the formulation of all
judicial procedure has further found expression by the act of
Congress authorizing the United States Supreme Court to formulate and adopt a complete uniform procedure in the District
Courts of the United States. While these rules have not yet been
finally approved or adopted by the court, nevertheless an examination of the most recent draft thereof, as prepared by the
Advisory Committee of fifteen, of which George Donworth, of Seattle, has been a member, discloses that many a familiar and
antiquated procedural figure has passed out of the picture to be
replaced by methods and rules more in keeping with the spirit of
the times, and in harmony with the expedition with which commercial transactions are now carried on, as compared with the
same transactions of a century ago.
It would seem most unfortunate that right in the midst of these
most painstaking efforts to prepare and complete a uniform set of
rules for the United States District Courts that the lower house
of Congress should have passed an act only last June, by the
terms of which the right of the United States District Judge to
comment upon the evidence should depend upon whether the same
was permitted by the local state law of the jurisdiction where the
trial was held.
Apparently nothing less than eternal vigilance will serve to
preserve judicial independence against legislative encroachment
even as to matters of procedure, a subject upon which the courts
themselves should have the exclusive control unless and until they
shall have abandoned and lost such right by neglect or refusal to
exercise the same.
It would seem to be the height of inconsistency for Congress
to have authorized by one act the creation and adoption of a
uniform system of procedure in the United States courts, and
while that effort is still under way, progressing rapidly toward a
favorable conclusion, to destroy such uniformity by the passage
of such a bit of ill-timed and unfortunate legislative interference.
This type of legislation is a splendid example of the wisdom of
leaving judicial procedure to the courts.
While upon the question of improved procedure made possible
by the rule making power, I wish to pay tribute to the splendid
services rendered by our Judicial Council, which has acted at all
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times, you may say, as a testing station, as a clearing house and
experimental laboratory for the purpose of sifting out and submitting to the bar every possible suggestion as to improvements in
procedure which any attorney or any judge might think of and_
submit to them for their preliminary survey. As you know, i
they feel such a suggestion has probable merit they then send
out a questionnaire to the entire bar, and if approved by a majority
it is then submitted to the Supreme Court. It would seem that
there is therefore no reason other than ordinary human fallibility,
why we should not look forward to a continued and satisfactory
development of our judiciary machinery which will at all times
be in the enjoyment of these laboratory tested improvements. A
Judicial Council is in session at all times, as compared with the
biennial session of the state legislature. A Judicial Council is
composed of judges and lawyers, whereas a legislature must depend upon securing the cooperation of a number of laymen to
whom the processes of the courts of law are largely a field of
mystery which they are perfectly willing shall continue to be
unexplored. And finally, such a Judicial Council, aided by the
experience of the bar and bench, can bring to these questions solutions which are entirely unaffected by any political logrolling
or other hazards which attend legislative efforts no matter how
meritorious they may be.
The United States Constitution
I think it is appropriate this year to make a brief reference
to the Constitution o . the United States. This is the one hundred
fiftieth anniversary of the drafting of the Constitution. In 1935
Congress passed an act in recognition of this event and creating
a "Sesquicentennial Commission", such commission to be charged
with the duty of encouraging and providing for suitable exercises commemorating this memorable anniversary.
The President of the United States by proclamation issued July
4, 1937, proclaimed a period from September 17, 1937, to April
30, 1939, for the commemoration of the one hundred fiftieth anniversary of the Constitution and of the inauguration of the first
President thereunder.
While the period of one hundred fifty years may seem brief
when viewed in the terms of the history of nations, yet when we
contemplate even casually the terrific rate of mortality anong the
nations of the world and their respective forms of government
during even the last twenty-five years, I think we may well agree
with the sentiment of the Sesquicentennial Commission Act, that
the occasion is one well worthy of our most serious reflection and
observance.
Your board has caused the appointment of a committee of
members throughout the entire state who have been vastly interested in the assisting of observance of this occasion. As you know,
we have for years had suitable exercises during Constitution
Week. It is the thought of the committee that, of course, it will
be impossible to carry on exercises over the entire period covered
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by the proclamation, but that during this week especially they
should be given in the various local communities.
It is a striking coincidence in public affairs that this very one
hundred fiftieth year should be the identical year in which our
Constitution has been subjected to the most serious and nationwide discussion and attention that it has received at any one time
since the Civil War period.
The whole constitutional theory of an independent judiciary
created and maintained as a coordinate independent branch of the
government, was subjected to assault by the proposal either to
retire, or outvote by newly added encumbents, those justices of
the Supreme Court whose decisions did not happen to conform
to the personal views of the executive. We were told in the early
days of the discussion that one unit of the supposed three-horse
governmental team was backward or derelict in the performance
of its fair share of the work which the team was supposed to do.
Assuming for a moment that the curious figure of speech was
ever apt, whereby three independent branches of government are
likened to a team tied together acting as one unit, I think the
general consensus of opinion now appears to be that there has
been a mistaken idea as to which one of the three horses was
guilty of a failure to appreciate its proper place in our constitutional scheme of separation of powers.
Regardless of the pros and cons of the criticism against the
Supreme Court decisions, it must be clear, as has been pointed
out by so many writers, that this proposed method of correction
was many times more dangerous than the ailment of which the
complaint was made.
It is of the very essence of government itself that all controversies be submitted to and decided by a tribunal free and independent of all political pressure and other extraneous influences.
The terrifying extent to which political pressure can and will be
applied was demonstrated in this very legislative fight to preserve
the independence of the judiciary. Members of the Congress were
subjected to and controlled by political considerations of the lowest
order in the very contest in which the independence of the court
was at stake. Is it reasonable to suppose that these same individuals, or any other individuals, if members of a court, would
be any less subservient to political pressure if a channel had thus
been created whereby political pressure could reach the judicial
department of the government?
It is worthy of note that the legal profession as a whole voted
about four to one against such an impairment of our judicial
structure. Our State Bar Association by a formal ballot voted
about seven to one against the proposition. The American Bar
Association members voted about six and a half to one, and then
the American Bar Association conducted a subsequent referendum
among all the lawyers of the nation, and that vote showed about
four to one against the proposal.
Legal Aid
There is another question which I think deserves brief comment
at this time, and that is the question of legal aid. One of the
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public responsibilities recognized by the bar generally has been
that of providing free legal services for those unable to pay the
cost of obtaining the assistance of attorneys for the establishment
or protection of their legal rights. In most instances I will say
that the necessity of legal aid arises in the larger centers of population. It was for that reason that your board during this year
discontinued having a state legal aid committee, since most of the
local bar associattions were maintaining such activity, of their
own. Upon further consideration of the matter, speaking solely
my own views upon it, I am of the opinion that there should be
a state chairman of a legal aid committee so that some central
office might at all times be available through which a clearance
could be made of legal aid requests from" communities having no
local committee or from points outside the state of Washington.
Such an office, in my opinion, would not be expected to furnish
directly the legal aid in such cases, but rather to supervise and
coordinate the rendering of such service by others throughout
the state, in those communities where, for instance, a local committee is not available.
We are perhaps accustomed to thinking of the word "need" in
terms of food, shelter and clothing. Such a limited conception,
however, is not at all adequate but we must take into consideration the necessity of making available legal aid where without
such aid valuable personal or family rights would be lost or endangered, and society as well as the individual suffer thereby.
Administration of Justice
I have perhaps spoken with some considerable emphasis upon
the question of the administration of justice, referring particularly
to the development of the rule-making power as an aid to the
proper functioning of the government, but after all is said and
done we must bear in mind, as justifying the stress that I tried
to place upon that function, we must bear in mind that, after all,
the real function of a member of the legal profession is the administration of justice, and I include in the term "legal profession"
not only the practitioner at the bar but also the judge upon the
bench and the instructor in the law school. We are in a sense,
gentlemen, "ministers of justice". By the very act of accepting
admission to the profession, we have automatically assumed a
peculiar responsibility for the proper functioning and improvement of machinery for this most important and essential element
of government itself. All of these topics which I have been discussing, such as legal aid, legal education, disciplinary matters,
and other topics which there is not time to discuss, do not possess
importance independently in themselves but they derive their importance only as they have a bearing upon the improvement of
the maintenance of administering justice.
That is why the profession is concerned with the subject of a
legal education. That is why we as a profession are concerned with
the subject of the unauthorized practice of the law. We are not
concerned so much with that question because we regret to see
some layman getting the work. Society is not interested at all in
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the question whether a layman or a lawyer performs a particular
legal service, if society could be assured that the service would be
equally well done in either case. That being true, it is entirely
immaterial as far as the public is concerned whether individual
A or B renders a particular service. What the public and the
profession are concerned with is in seeing that these legal services
are performed in the most competent manner without prejudice
or damage to the rights of those by whom valuable legal rights
have been entrusted for attention.
Again, take the question of the increasing number of administrative boards for the determination of controversies, the rapid
growth of which we cannot overlook. I will not, of course, presume
to discuss this subject in any great detail in view of the fact that
it is up for discussion later on in our program by one who is
eminently qualified to enlighten us upon it. But what we are
concerned with is in seeing that these administrative boards do
render and hand down a quality of justice that is at least equal
to that administered by the courts of law. Mlay I quote briefly
from a former president of the American Bar Association:
"The aversion of the average man is rather to the procedural and administrative side of our legal machinery.
He believes in and needs the administration of justice
according to law; the safety of his transactions requires
certainty and rule as the basis of individual and property
rights. Uncertainty and inequality were long ago called
'The twin bugaboos of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence'. Popular dissatisfaction with the law, as I have come to believe, is based not so much upon any variance between
justice according to the substantive law and justice
according to the arbitrium boni viri, as upon the great
variance between the justice which would result from a fair,
prompt determination of controversies according to substantive legal principles and the 'justice' which does result
from the existing procedural mechanism of our courts. Business men go to arbitrationto avoid legal procedureand not
legal principles. To 'tune up' and 'speed up' our judicial
mechanism, to 'cut out' the delay and 'lost motion', to
organize our courts and their workings along lines which
take cognizance of twentieth century experience and expedients, and to bring to the aid of the courts those direct
and simple administrative aids which modern progress
has made available in every field of activity, are some of
the paramount tasks of the present day, in which every
young man coming to the bar should plan to do his part."
The assertion is sometimes made that the activities of these
various agencies modifying the old acceptation of administration
of justice will completely change, if not utterly destroy, the present conception of the function of the lawyer. But if the lawyer
is to be displaced either in whole or in part by new agencies it
would not be the first time in the history of society that a legitimate occupation has been so superseded.
Whether the functions heretofore performed by the lawyers and
the courts shall in the future be performed in whole or in part by
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some different agency should depend upon whether such other
agency or method affords any improvement over the present system. It is not an unheard of thing for an occupation or an institution to be entirely displaced by the march of progress. We no
longer have the gas lighter making his rounds of the streets at
dusk; the maker of the flintlock musket was long ago forced into
other occupations. The "horse and buggy" has been displaced and
has no place except in exalted places, and then only as a figure of
speech.
But in each instance the occupation or the contrivance in question has passed out of our picture only because it has been replaced
by a better method of securing the same or a better result.
But suppose we consider whether or not these new agencies
which may displace our system of administering justice are an
improvement over the present method, and consider whether or
not our present methods of administering justice may not be
swept aside, either in whole or in part, because of an avalanche
of popular impatience with the methods of appliances with which
the present system has so long been content to function.
Here, I take it, is the real obligation of the courts and the lawyer, because we are in the most essential sense the custodians of
that particular function, the administration of justice, and the
administration of justice is not only a function of government, it
is the function of government without which no government can
possibly exist.
It is an old and threadbare statement, of course, that the practice of law is a profession and not merely a money-making proposition. We all know that. We have become weary of hearing it
spoken. And yet I am sufficiently optimistic as to believe that
there may be still some additional meaning or possible unused
value squeezed out of that venerable expression if we dwell for a
moment upon the reasons why that statement is true. Let us not
take it for granted any more for a moment, but see why it is
true that the profession of law is something more than a moneymaking occupation. Granted, of course, that a lawyer has to
make sufficient money in his occupation to live while he is doing
it, and granted that it is not the primary, and should not be the
primary purpose for which he is so engaged, I think the real reason
why that distinction must be made, and why that distinction is
well founded is that the lawyer knows that he is ai inseparable
part of a most essential function that is the very essence of government itself. That is something that you don't measure in terms
of the book work required.
We had the spectacle, for example, of an eminent member of
our bar devoting his tmie to drafting the Workmen's Compensation Act without a particle of financial gain, and no hope of financial gain. We have another member of our bar devoting his time
and special talents upon this Advisory Committee for the purpose of establishing this reform in the procedure. The members
of our Board of Governors have been spending hours and days
and days trying to make improvements in the very thing I am
discussing, namely, the improvement of the administration of
justice. Your Board of Governors, your trial committees, if thiey
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sought only their personal convenience, could find many, many
more pleasant ways to spend their time than discussing whether
or not an attorney should be reinstated. Those things all show
that we are a part of the government in its most vital aspect.
I think that this particular viewpoint was most ably portrayed
by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court last
spring when addressing the meeting of the American Law Institute. He said this:
"The success of democratic institutions lies in the success of the processes of reason as opposed to the tyranny
of force. Between these society must choose. If society
chooses the processes of reason, it must maintain the institutions which embody those processes. Institutions for the
exercise of the law-making power and for the execution
of laws must have their fitting complement in institutions
for the interpretation and application of laws, for the
safeguarding of individual rights, through a competent
and independent judiciary. The firm and true administration of justice is thus the primary concern of civilized
society. That administration must find its ultimate assurance, not in statutes or forms, but in the sentiment of a
free people - themselves tolerant and reasonable and
keenly alive to the necessity of maintaining the instrumentalities for the impartial determination of controversies."
I thank you.

Superior Court Judges Promulgate
New Rules
The Association of Superior Court Judges at its meeting in
Bellingham in August adopted the following general rules relating
to practice in all Superior Courts throughout the state:
"In all cases where a party has appeared in an action through
an attorney the judge will not sign any orders or judgments in
such action unless such orders or judgments are presented by
such attorney of record, or unless they bear the approval of such
attorney for the party for whose benefit such order or judgment is
being presented. If the order or decree is presented by an attorney
on behalf of a party to a divorce action who did not appear in
the original action such order or judgment must bear the approval
of the attorney of record, or an affidavit setting forth the service
of such order or judgment has been made upon the attorney of
record for the prevailing party at least three days prior to the
presentation of the order."
Amend, Rule 5, General Rules, so that the last paragraph of
same shall read as follows:
"The Court shall hear no default divorce case until the judgment fee has been paid and the receipt of the clerk tendered to
the Court with the proposed decree before a witness is sworn. If
the decree is granted, the proposed form shall be signed by the
Court as amended and immediately handed to the clerk for the
record. "

